Property, War Objectives, And Slave Labor Claims: The Ninth Circuit\u27s Political Question Analysis in Alperin v. Vatican Bank by Hart, Reuben
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 36
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey Article 4
January 2006
Property, War Objectives, And Slave Labor Claims:
The Ninth Circuit's Political Question Analysis in
Alperin v. Vatican Bank
Reuben Hart
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Civil Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reuben Hart, Property, War Objectives, And Slave Labor Claims: The Ninth Circuit's Political Question Analysis in Alperin v. Vatican Bank,
36 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2006).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss1/4
NOTE 
PROPERTY, WAR OBJECTIVES, AND 
SLAVE LABOR CLAIMS: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S POLITICAL 
QUESTION ANALYSIS IN ALPERIN v. 
VATICAN BANK 
INTRODUCTION 
Igor Najfeld was born in Yugoslavia on June 28, 1944, the same day 
his mother and father escaped from three years of slave labor at the 
hands of the Nazi-controlled government in Croatia, ("the Ustasha,,).l 
Najfeld's grandparents were murdered by the Ustahsa, along with at least 
fifty-six members of his mother's relatives? All of Najfeld's relatives 
lost their property, which included a department store and other assets, to 
the Ustasha regime.3 
Five decades later, Najfeld, along with twenty-three other survivors 
of the Ustasha regime and four organizations ("Holocaust Survivors") 
brought a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California against the Istituto per Ie Opere di Religione, also known as 
the Vatican Bank, for crimes allegedly committed in connection with the 
Ustasha regime during and after World War 11.4 The suit also named the 
I Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at'll IS, Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d 
686 (N.D. CaL 2003) (No. C99-494I MMC), (available at 
http://www.vaticanbankclaims.comlvatcom.htm) (last visited 2/20106). 
2 1d. 
3 1d. 
4 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2005). em. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1141 
(2006), eert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1160 (2006). 
19 
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Order of Friars Minor and the Croatian Liberation Movement as 
defendants.s The Order of Friars Minor is more generally recognized as 
the organization of Franciscan Monks, and includes Franciscans from 
around the world.6 The Croatian Liberation Movement is allegedly the 
successor organization to the Ustasha, and allegedly has been involved in 
terrorism in the United States and other places.7 The Holocaust 
Survivors claim that the Vatican Bank, the Order of Friars Minor, and the 
Croatian Liberation Movement were complicit in and profited from 
crimes committed during World War II by the Ustasha.8 The Holocaust 
Survivors' claims included conversion, unjust enrichment (including 
profit from slave labor), restitution, the right to an accounting, human 
rights violations and violations of international law, including war 
crimes, crimes against peace, torture, rape, and genocide.9 
The parties agreed to limit initial district court arguments to the 
application of the political question doctrine to the controversy, and 
District Court Judge Maxine Chesney dismissed all claims as 
nonjusticiable political questions. \0 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, in a majority opinion written by Judge M. Margaret McKeown, 
addressed the defendants' contention that the claims were nonjusticiable 
political questions. I I The majority founded its decision on a demarcation 
between - what the court labeled as - property claims (conversion, unjust 
enrichment, restitution, and the right to an accounting) and war 
objectives claims (violations of human rights and international law).12 
The court permitted the property claims to proceed and dismissed the 
war objectives claims as political questions. 13 
This Note will analyze the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alperin v. 
Vatican Bank,14 and propose that while the court's demarcation between 
property claims and war objectives claims may be a sound analytical 
method for addressing political question doctrine issues, the slave labor 
claims should not have been excluded from the scope of the property 
claims. 
Part I of this Note will provide a background of the political 
5 1d. 
6 1d. at 542. 
7 1d. 
8 1d. at 538. 
9 1d. 
10 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d 686, 689 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
II Alperin, 410 F.3d at 537-538. 
12 See Id. at 547 -562. 
I3 Id. at 562. 
14 Id. at 538, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1141 (2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1160 (2006). 
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question doctrine, its case law and history, with a focus on political 
questions involving foreign relations. 15 Part II will provide a background 
and analysis of the majority opinion in Alperin v. Vatican Bank,16 
particularly the court's distinction between property and war objectives 
claims. 17 Part III will show that the court's demarcation between 
property and war objectives claims is a useful tool in resolving political 
question issues. 18 Finally, Part IV will argue that, given the distinction 
between property and war objectives claims, the Ninth Circuit should 
have included the slave labor claims within the scope of the property 
claims and not within the war objectives claims. 19 This Note ultimately 
concludes that the slave labor claims are not political questions and are 
therefore justiciable.2o 
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE 
The political question doctrine is one of the justiciability doctrines 
that limit the cases and controversies the Federal Judiciary will decide.21 
The political question doctrine originates from comments made by Chief 
Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. 22 Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote that "[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in 
this court.'.23 The primary purpose of the political question doctrine is to 
support the separation of powers between the three branches of the 
federal government. 24 The political branches of government - the 
Congress and the Executive - have roles distinct from the Judiciary, and 
the Judiciary must respect those distinctions?5 Still, the courts must 
determine whether a political question exists because the United States 
15 See infra notes 21-102 and accompanying text. 
16 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 538, cen. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1141 (2006), cerro denied, 126 S. Ct. 
1160 (2006). 
17 See infra notes 103-205 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 206-221 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 222-233 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 234-235 and accompanying text. 
21 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28 (Aspen 2001). "There are 
five major justiciability doctrines: the prohibition against advisory opinions, standing, ripeness, 
mootness, and the political question doctrine. All must be met for any federal court, at any level, to 
hear a case." 
22 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); see also Alperin, 410 F.3d at 544. 
23 Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 170; see also Alperin, 410 F.3d at 544. 
24 Baker V. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,210 (1962). 
25 [d. at 210-211. 
3
Hart: Property, War Objectives, And Slave Labor
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
22 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
Supreme Court is the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.,,26 
A. MODERN POLITICAL QUESTION ANALYSIS UNDER BAKER V. CARR 
Modem political question analysis originates in the landmark case 
of Baker v. Carr.27 In Baker, a case in which the plaintiffs alleged 
mal apportionment of Tennessee Assembly seats, the Supreme Court 
described six situations in which a nonjusticiable political question 
exists.28 The six situations are: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a 
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of 
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
b . d . 29 pronouncements y varIOus epartments on one questIOn. 
Only if one or more of these "formulations is inextricable from the case 
at bar" should a court find a nonjusticiable political question.3D 
The Court in Baker limited the political question doctrine to ensure 
that courts do not improperly find a case nonjusticiable.31 For example, 
the "doctrine . . . is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political 
cases. ",32 Thus, even though a decision in a case might implicate one of 
the political branches, the political question doctrine will not bar the case 
unless it implicates one of the six formulations?3 Moreover, whether the 
political question doctrine bars a particular case must be decided 
individually, on a case by case basis, because it is impossible to resolve 
these issues "by any semantic cataloguing. ,,34 
26 Id. at 211. 
27 Id. at 186. 
28 Id. at 187-188, 217. 
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B. A DESCRIPTION OF THE SIX-PRONG TEST IN BAKER 
Baker set forth six independent tests to determine whether dismissal 
is required under the political question doctrine.35 These tests, however, 
"are more discrete in theory than in practice," and tend to overlap.36 The 
Supreme Court has indicated that the six prongs are "probably listed in 
descending order of both importance and certainty.,,37 Because any of 
the six Baker tests can be dispositive, it is worthwhile to examine the 
meaning of each prong separately.38 
1. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment 
The first prong requires dismissal if a decision is entrusted to a 
nonjudicial branch of government and the court can demonstrate this 
entrustment in the text and structure of the constitution.39 The text of the 
Constitution explicitly commits certain powers to a nonjudicial branch, 
including Congress's power to declare war and to raise an arm/o and the 
President's power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make 
treaties.41 The Judiciary lacks the power to decide cases which 
improperly intrude on these powers.42 However, many textually 
demonstrable commitments are not explicit, and must be inferred from 
the text and structure of the Constitution.43 
The power to try impeachments is an example of a textual 
Constitutional commitment to a nonjudicial branch, and the Supreme 
Court has inferred a prohibition on judicial review of the Senate's 
impeachment tria\s.44 In Nixon v. United States, the Supreme Court 
addressed the question of whether federal courts can review the 
procedures used by the Senate in its impeachment trials.45 In that case, 
Federal District Court Judge Walter Nixon, Jr. was accused of making 
at 544. 
35 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004); Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see Alperin, 410 F.3d 
36 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 544; see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,228-229 (1993). 
37 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278. 
38 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 547. 
39 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II, 12 (Clause II grants Congress the power to "To declare 
War ... "; Clause 12 grants Congress the power "To raise and support Armies .... "). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
42 See e.g. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 997, 1002-1006 (1979) (plurality opinion 
discussing the power to terminate treaties). 
43 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J. concurring); see Alperin, 4\0 F.3d at 549. 
44 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226. 
45 [d. 
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false statements to a grand jury in a case investigating bribery.46 Judge 
Nixon was convicted and sentenced to prison.47 Because he refused to 
resign from the Federal Judiciary, Judge Nixon continued to collect his 
salary and benefits while in prison.48 The House of Representatives 
adopted three articles of impeachment for high crimes and 
misdemeanors, and the Senate convicted Judge Nixon on two of the 
articles.49 Judge Nixon claimed that the Constitution prohibited the 
procedures adopted by the Senate, which permitted a committee to take 
evidence and testimony, rather than the full Senate.50 
The Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution's Impeachment 
Clause to reach its decision that the case was a political question.51 The 
word "sole" in the Constitution indicates that the Senate is the only 
governmental branch with the power to conduct impeachment trialS.52 
Thus, even though the courts are not explicitly barred from exercising 
judicial review of impeachments, the Court in Nixon held that the 
Judiciary does not have the power to review impeachment trials because 
the text of the Constitution commits the power to try impeachments to 
the Senate.53 
2. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards 
Courts must also dismiss a case if no judicially discoverable or 
manageable standard exists by which a court can resolve a case.54 The 
Supreme Court recently addressed this prong of the Baker test in Vieth v. 
Jubilirer.55 The plaintiffs in Vieth alleged that the Pennsylvania 
Congressional districts were unconstitutional because of political 
gerrymandering.56 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a plurality, 




49 [d. at 226-228. 
50 [d. at 227-228. 
51 [d. at 229-233; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (''The Senate shall have the sole Power to try 
all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the 
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no Person shall be 
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present."). 
52 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229. 
53 [d. at 238. 
54 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277-278. 
55 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267. 
56/d. at 271-273. 
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for deciding political gerrymandering cases.57 Justice Anthony Kennedy 
agreed that no standards currently exist, but refused to foreclose the 
possibility that workable standards might be discovered in the future. 58 
The plurality held that "judicial action must be governed by 
standard, by rule.,,59 While Congress can be "inconsistent, illogical, and 
ad hoc" in its laws, "[the] law pronounced by the courts must be 
principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.,,6o The courts 
simply cannot provide a reasoned distinction as to why a particular 
district should be drawn in a particular place and not in another.61 
According to the plurality, even if political gerrymandering exists, the 
courts are not equipped to resolve these cases based on reasoned 
distinctions.62 
3. Initial Policy Determination 
If a court cannot decide a case without making a policy judgment 
which must first be determined by a nonjudicial branch, the case must be 
dismissed as a political question.63 In Gilligan v. Morgan, the Supreme 
Court analyzed a case brought by victims of National Guard violence at 
Kent State University in 1970.64 The plaintiffs sought an injunction to 
prevent premature deployment of National Guard troops to civil 
disorders and an injunction against future violations of students' 
Constitutional rights.65 The plaintiffs were not requesting damages for 
past injury resulting from unlawful action, and were not attempting to 
prevent imminent unlawful action, but brought the action to establish 
continuing judicial control over the Ohio National Guard.66 
The Judiciary could not resolve the case in favor of the plaintiffs 
without making a policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
determination.67 Resolution in favor of the students would require 
"continuing surveillance by a federal court over the training, weaponry 
and orders of the [National] Guard," which would require an inquiry into 
57 Id. at 281. 
58 Id. at 306 (Kennedy, 1. concurring). 
59 Id. at 278. 
60 Id. 
61 /d. at 280-281. 
62/d. 
63 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
64 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,3 (1973). 
65 Id. at 3. 
66 Id. at 5. 
67 Id. at 7-8. 
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proper law enforcement policy and procedures.68 The power to set 
National Guard policy· is not entrusted to the Judiciary, but to the 
Executive and Congress.69 As well as violating the first Baker prong, the 
case would require improper determinations of policy which belong to a 
nonjudicial branch.7o 
4. Lack of Respect Due the Coordinate Branches of Government 
If adjudication of a case would show a lack of respect owed to a 
coordinate branch of government, the case is a nonjusticiable political 
question.7! However, simply interpreting the Constitution does not, by 
itself, show a lack of respect for a coordinate branch.72 Nor does a 
court's exercise of judicial review of a Congressional statute show a lack 
of respect for a coordinate branch.73 In Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner 
Bank AG, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed a case 
against two German banks alleging theft of the plaintiff s interest in a 
manufacturing company during World War 11.74 The court found that the 
claims were not political questions, but upheld dismissal of the claims on 
other grounds.75 
The court in Ungaro interpreted the Foundation Agreement, which 
is an agreement created by the United States and Germany to resolve 
World War II-era claims against German companies.76 The United 
States, in compliance with requirements in the Foundation Agreement, 
filed a statement of interest urging that the Foundation Agreement should 
be the exclusive forum for resolution of these claims.77 The Eleventh 
Circuit decided that judicial resolution of the claims would not show lack 
of respect due the coordinate branches of government solely because of 
the Executive's statement of interest.78 Although such statements are 
entitled to respect and deference, they are not decisive.79 Resolution of 
the claims would not place demands on foreign governments, thereby 
68 [d. at 7. 
69 [d. 
70 [d. at 8. 
71 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
72 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1001. 
73 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390, 391 (1990). 
74 Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004). 
75 [d. at 1232, 1235. 
76 [d. at 1234. 
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showing disrespect for the Executive's foreign policy decisions.8o The 
Foundation Agreement itself contemplated judicial involvement in 
similar cases.81 
5. Unquestioning Adherence to a Policy Decision Already Made 
If resolution of a claim would interfere with the need to adhere to a 
policy decision made by another branch, a court should dismiss the claim 
as a political question.82 If a claim does not implicate a nonjudicial 
policy decision, then no need exists to adhere to a policy determination.83 
In Klinghoffer v. S.N. C. Achille Lauro, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization challenged the justiciability of a tort suit filed against it for 
the death of a passenger which occurred during the highjacking of a 
cruise ship.84 Although the specific grounds of the political question 
defense were not entirely clear, the Palestine Liberation Organization 
claimed that the case "raise[d] foreign policy questions and political 
questions in a volatile context lacking satisfactory criteria for judicial 
determination.,,85 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization's argument that the claims were 
political questions.86 Regarding the fifth prong of the Baker test, the 
Second Circuit stated that no adherence was required because "no prior 
political decisions are questioned--or even implicated-by the matter 
before US.,,87 
6. Multifarious Pronouncementi8 
If resolution of a claim could cause embarrassment as a result of 
multifarious pronouncements from different branches, a court should 
dismiss the claim as a political question.89 In a case brought by 
conservation groups to enforce an international anti-whaling agreement 
80 [d. at 1236 n.12. 
81 /d. at 1235. 
82 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
83 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 557-558 (citing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 50 
(2d Cir. 1999), and Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1047 (9th Cir. 
1983)). 
84 Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 45. 
85 [d. at 49. 
86 [d. at 50. 
87 [d. 
88 Multifarious is "having a great variety and diversity." Concise Oxford Dictionary 936 
(Judy Pearsall, ed., 10th ed. 1999). 
89 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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against Japan, the Supreme Court addressed the sixth Baker prong.90 The 
Japanese argued that resolution of the claim would cause embarrassment 
because it would require the Judiciary to order the Secretary of 
Commerce to repudiate an international agreement.91 The Supreme 
Court disagreed, and held that the interpretation of statutes, treaties, and 
executive agreements was the business of the courts, even if contrary to 
the opinion of another branch.92 
C. CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE CASES 
Political question cases have, despite the impossibility of 
"resolution by any semantic cataloguing," fallen into several broad 
categories.93 For example, cases invoking the Guaranty Clause of the 
Constitution have been found to involve the political question doctrine.94 
"Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide 
what government is the established one in a State.,,95 Other categories of 
political question have included, for example, the duration of hostilities 
during war96 and the status of Indian tribes,97 although again, these 
categories are not absolute.98 
Many political question doctrine cases involve foreign relations.99 
The Supreme Court has stated, "[tlhe conduct of the foreign relations of 
our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and 
legislative-'the political' -departments of the government, and the 
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is 
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."loo The Court in Baker 
carefully limited this idea, however: "[Ilt is error to suppose that every 
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial 
cognizance.,,101 Rather, each question must be analyzed individually for 
90 Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221. 224. 228-230 (1986). 
91 [d. at 229. 
92 [d. at 230. The Court decided against the conservation groups on other grounds. [d. at 
240-241. 
93 Baker. 369 U.S. at 217. 
94 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ('The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Fonn of Government .... ); Baker, 369 U.S. at 218-229; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 
How.) 1,42 (1849) ("Under [the Guarantee Clause] article of the Constitution it rests with Congress 
to decide what government is the established one in a State."). 
95 Baker, 369 U.S. at 220 (quoting Luther, 48 U.S. (I How.) at 42-44). 
96 [d. at 213-215. 
97 [d. at 215-217. 
98 [d. at 216-217. 
99 [d. at 211-214. 
100 [d. at 212 n.31 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Lether Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918». 
lOl [d. at 211. 
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"its susceptibility to judicial handling . . . " and the "possible 
consequences of judicial action.,,102 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION IN ALPERIN V. VATICAN 
BANK 
The plaintiffs in Alperin claimed that the defendant organizations 
were complicit in and profited from the crimes committed by the Ustasha 
during World War 11. 103 At the district court, the parties agreed to limit 
initial arguments to whether the claims should be dismissed because of 
the political question doctrine. I04 The Ninth Circuit reversed, in part, the 
district court decision dismissing claims brought by the Holocaust 
Survivors against the Vatican Bank and other defendants. 105 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
From 1941 until 1945, the Ustasha controlled the state of Croatia 
and portions of the former Soviet Union.106 The victims were subject to 
systematic extermination by the Ustasha with the help of German forces, 
and suffered physical, monetary, and property losses, including being 
used as slave labor. 107 As many as 700,000 people, mostly Serbs, were 
murdered in Ustasha death camps. lOS According to the plaintiffs, the 
Vatican and other Catholic institutions supported, or at least turned a 
blind eye to the atrocities. lo9 Following the end of World War II, the 
Vatican was allegedly complicit in funneling money from the Ustasha to 
its own coffers. I 10 
The class action was brought on behalf of "[a]ll Serbs, Jews, and 
former Soviet Union citizens (and their heirs and beneficiaries), who 
2003). 
102 [d. at 211-212. 
103 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 538. 
104 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 689. 
105 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 538, 562-563, rev'g in part Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d 686 (N.D. Cal. 
106 Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (citing Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'll'lI 1,43). 
107 Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'Ill. 
108 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 540 (citing BUREAU OF PuB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. 
No. 10557, U.S. ALLIED WARTIME AND POSTWAR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH 
ARGENTINA, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND TuRKEY ON LOOTED GoLD AND GERMAN EXTERNAL 
ASSETS AND U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE WARTIME USTASHA TREASURY, 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRELIMINARY STUDY ON U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO RECOVER AND 
RESTORE GoLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II, 
142 (1998) ("Ustasha Treasury Report")). 
109 [d. at 540. 
110 [d. at 540, 543. 
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suffered" losses under the Ustasha regime. 111 Named plaintiffs in this 
action include victims of personal and property crimes committed by the 
U stasha.112 Additionally, four organizations that represent Holocaust 
Survivors and human rights organizations are named as plaintiffs. I 13 The 
class is potentially massive, and could include "over 300,000 former 
slave and forced laborers, prisoners, concentration camp, and ghetto 
survivorS.,,114 The class could extend geographically from the former 
Soviet Union to the former Yugoslavia, including Croatia, Bosnia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. 115 
The defendants in Alperin include the Vatican Bank, but not the 
Vatican. 116 The plaintiffs alleged, and the Ninth Circuit accepted for the 
limited purposes of a motion to dismiss, that the Vatican Bank and the 
Vatican are distinct institutions.ll7 The Vatican Bank is headed by a 
Vatican official, but conducts for-profit banking transactions worldwide, 
including in the United States. I IS Any suit against the Vatican itself 
might be subject to dismissal for reasons of sovereign immunity. 119 Still, 
the Bank's dealings, transactions, and holdings are difficult to 
ascertain. 120 Other defendants include the Order of Friars Minor and the 
Croatian Liberation Movement, as well as other unknown Catholic 
religious organizations and known and unknown banking institutions 
f . f . 121 rom a vanety 0 countnes. 
The plaintiffs alleged causes of action for conversion, unjust 
enrichment, restitution, the right to an accounting, human rights 
violations and violations of international law. 122 The plaintiffs claim 
subject matter jurisdiction under several federal statutes, California state 
law, international law, and common law. 123 
III Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at ,)[15; Alperin, 410 F.3d at 541. 
112 Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 687. 
113 Id. 
114 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 541. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 541-542. 
117 Id. at 542. 
118 Id. 
119 See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-487 (1983). 
120 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 542 n.6. A former U.S. Department of Justice Nazi-hunting officer is 
quoted as saying, "The Vatican Bank is one of the most secretive financial institutions in the world. 
The exact nature and ownership of the Vatican Bank is difficult to ascertain owing to the secrecy 
surrounding it." Alperin, 410 F.3d at 542. 
121 Id. at 541-542. 
122 Id. at 543. 
123 The plaintiffs claim federal subject matter jurisdiction under the "Alien Tort Statute, 28 
U.S.c. § 1350 ... , the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 ... , 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
federal common law to the extent it incorporates customary intemationallaw and treaties, diversity 
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The Vatican Bank and Order of Friars Minor filed separate motions 
in the district court to dismiss the plaintiff s Complaint. 124 The parties 
agreed to limit discussion to "whether the plaintiffs' claims should be 
dismissed under the political question doctrine.,,125 The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California held that the claims 
were nonjusticiable political questions and dismissed the case. 126 In a 
separate opinion, the district court dismissed the claims against the 
Croatian Liberation Movement for lack of personal jurisdiction. 127 The 
Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of claims against the Croatian 
Liberation Movement because the courts lacked personal jurisdiction. 128 
However, the Ninth Circuit permitted several of the plaintiffs' claims to 
proceed against the remaining defendants, holding that the claims were 
not barred by the political question doctrine. 129 
B. THE MAJORITY'S REASONING IN ALPERIN V. VATICAN BANK 
The majority in Alperin held that some of the Holocaust Survivors' 
claims, dubbed property claims, were not political questions. 130 The 
majority also dismissed certain claims, dubbed war objectives claims, as 
political questions.13I The foundation of the majority's position is the 
demarcation between the property and human rights claims. The court 
classified the claims according to whether they are property claims or 
war objectives claims rather than addressing the claims as a whole or 
each claim individually as it appeared in the Complaint. 132 The 
Complaint did not list causes of action for war objectives claims and 
property claims; rather, the plaintiffs alleged causes of action for 
conversion, unjust enrichment, the right to an accounting, restitution, and 
human rights violations and violations of international law .133 The court 
classified the causes of action for conversion, unjust enrichment, 
restitution, and accounting, as property claims.134 The causes of action 
jurisdiction, and California state law." [d. at 541. 
124 Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 687. 
125 [d. at 689. 
126 [d. at 695. 
127 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, No. C99-494l MMC(EDL), 2003 WL 21303209, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. May 29, 2003). 




J32 [d. at 548. 
133 [d. at 543; see Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'll'II 76-97. 
134 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 548. 
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for human rights violations and violations of intemationallaw, including 
the slave labor claims, were classified as war objectives claims.135 
By classifying the claims into property and war objectives 
categories, the court attempted to make the determination of justiciability 
for the property claims predictable while making the finding of 
nonjusticiability for the war objectives claims inevitable. War is the 
business of the political branches, not the judiciary .136 In contrast, the 
property claims are "garden-variety legal and equitable claims for the 
recovery of property," and do not involve the sticky foreign relations 
issues which might implicate the political question doctrine. 13? 
1. The Justiciability of the Property Claims 
After distinguishing between the property and war objectives 
claims, the court spent considerable effort to show why the property 
claims were justiciable under each Baker test. 138 According to the court, 
each of the six Baker tests must be addressed because "any single test 
can be dispositive.,,139 
a. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment 
First, the court noted that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly 
commit the property claims to a nonjudicial branch.14o "[T]here are few, 
if any, explicit and unequivocal instances in the Constitution of this sort 
of textual commitment .... ,,141 Thus, courts must infer whether a textual 
commitment exists from the text and structure of the Constitution.142 
The court in Alperin recognized that foreign relations are generally 
managed by the political branches and that courts consistently defer to 
the other branches of government in matters of foreign relations. 143 As 
the Court in Baker pointed out, however, courts must also understand 
that political question analysis must proceed on a case by case basis, and 
135 [d. 
136 See e.g. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II, 12 (Clause 11 grants Congress the power to ''To 
declare War ... "; Clause 12 grants Congress the power "To raise and support Armies .... "); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I (''The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy .... "). 
137 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 548. 
138 [d. at 548-558. 
139 [d. at 547. 
140 [d. at 549. 
141 [d. at 549 (quoting Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240-241 (White, J., concurring». 
142 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J. concurring); see Alperin, 410 F.3d at 549. 
143 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 549. 
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"it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."I44 
Perhaps the most important determination in the section analyzing 
the first Baker prong is that no treaty or executive agreement expressly 
bars the Holocaust Survivors' claims.145 The court pointed out that the 
Executive Branch has not committed the United States to a particular 
course of action regarding Ustasha-related claims, as it had for example, 
with the Japanese Peace Treaty, which precluded all claims arising out of 
Japanese actions during World War 11. 146 The majority agreed that the 
presence or absence of a treaty or executive agreement is not strictly 
determinative of whether a political question exists. 147 However, the 
court reiterated that the real question is not whether an agreement or 
treaty exists, but whether a demonstrable textual commitment of the 
claims to another branch of government exists under the constitution. 148 
According to the court in Alperin, "[r]eparation for stealing, even during 
wartime, is not a claim that finds textual commitment in the 
Constitution. ,,149 
The court in Alperin pointed out that the property claims are similar 
to claims in earlier cases that involve looted assets that did not implicate 
the political question doctrine. 150 According to the majority, the 
Holocaust Survivors' claims are analogous to those asserted in Republic 
of Austria v. Altmann, 151 which permitted claims against an Austrian 
State art gallery for recovery of six paintings stolen during World War 
II. 152 Because the Supreme Court did not address the political question 
doctrine in Altmann, that decision cannot be used as a direct proposition 
that the claims are not political questions. 153 However, the Altmann 
claims involved looted assets, which is useful in determining 
144 [d. at 550 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211). 
145 See /d. at 549-550. 
146 [d. 
147 [d. at 550-551. 
148 [d. at 551. 
149 [d. at 551. In his dissent, Judge Trott argued that a treaty with Italy should decide the 
outcome of the case. [d. at 567-568 (Trott, J. dissenting). The majority rejected this proposition 
because the Vatican is a sovereign entity separate from Italy, and was not party to the treaty. [d. at 
550 n.11. Moreover, the Court "must accept the Complaint's demarcation between the Vatican 
Bank, which is named as a defendant, and the Vatican, which is not .... " [d. at 550. Thus, no 
treaty or executive agreement controls the outcome of the case. 
150 [d. at 551 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) and Urtited States 
v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 WL 553532,2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 6445 (S.D. N.Y. 
2002». 
151 Altmann, 541 U.S. 677. 
152 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 551 (citing Altmann, 541 U.S. 677). 
153 [d. 
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justiciability because the Alperin claims also involve looted assets. 154 
The court also discussed United States v. Portrait of Wally, ISS in which 
the United States brought an action involving looted assets. 156 The 
majority argued that, like Altmann and Portrait of Wally, the property 
claims are really allegations that the defendant is wrongfully holding 
assets. IS? 
b. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards 
The second prong of the Baker test requires a court to determine 
whether the courts can apply "judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards" to resolve the case, or whether the judiciary is not equipped to 
adjudicate the claim before the court. ISS The majority pointed to Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, in which a Supreme Court plurality declared political 
gerrymandering cases nonjusticiable under the second Baker prong: 159 
Lest there be any doubt, Vieth refines and redirects the inquiry [into 
the second Baker prong]. In light of the Court's clarification in Vieth, 
we take a slightly different approach to interpreting the phrase 
')udicially discoverable and manageable standards." Instead of 
focusing on the logistical obstacles, we ask whether the courts are 
capable of granting relief in a reasoned fashion or, on the other hand, 
whether allowing the Property Claims to go forward would merely 
provide "hope" without a substantive legal basis for a ruling. 160 
Courts have been utterly unable to find workable standards for resolving 
political gerrymandering cases. 161 Conversely, courts routinely resolve 
common law property claims based on settled legal standards. 162 
That the Holocaust Survivors' claims face daunting evidentiary 
hurdles does not mean that courts are unable to apply a judicially 
154 [d. at 551. 
155 Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 WL 553532,2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 6445. 
156 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 551 (citing Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 WL 553532, 
2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 6445). 
157 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 551. 
158 [d. at 552 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
159 [d. at 552-555 (discussing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267). Although Justice Kennedy concurred 
with the decision in Vieth, he declined to join the plurality in holding that all gerrymandering cases 
are nonjusticiable; courts might discover a plausible system to address gerrymandering in the future, 
but have not yet done so. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306. 
160 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 553 (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 304). 
161 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 280. 
162 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 553. 
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discoverable or manageable standard. 163 Rather, claims seeking 
compensation for stolen property are common types of claims, and 
include common law tort rules that are settled and easily applied by the 
district court. l64 Similarly, courts can use such innovations as the 
Manual for Complex Litigation, special masters, and the innovations of 
modern class action certification analysis to help overcome the problems 
of large complex litigation. 165 Although the property claims are 
complicated and face difficulties, they are the kind of claims which 
courts regularly decide based on reasoned distinctions. 166 Thus, this 
prong of the Baker test is not a bar. 
c. Necessity for an Initial Policy'Determination 
The third prong of the Baker analysis prohibits claims which require 
an "initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion.,,167 The majority argued that the Holocaust Survivors' 
property claims do not require any improper pronouncements on United 
States foreign policy.168 Therefore, an initial pronouncement from a 
nonjudicial source need not be obtained. 169 Moreover, the property 
claims do not require the courts to make pronouncements on foreign 
policy.170 Thus, the third Baker prong is thus not applicable. 
d. Lack of Respect for the Coordinate Branches of Government 
The fourth prong of the Baker analysis requires dismissal if the 
Judiciary cannot address a claim without showing a lack of respect for 
the coordinate branches of government. 171 The analysis in this section of 
the majority's decision rests on the lack of Executive involvement in the 
163 [d. 
164 [d. at 553-554 (citing Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49). 
165 See Fed. R. Civ. P. § 53(b)(ii); see also Allen-Myiand, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 770 
F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("The language of the Rule [53] ... specifically provides for 
reference to special master in non-jury trials for 'matters of account and of difficult computation of 
damages"'.). 
166 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 554. The Court disapproves of the "somewhat anachronistic" 
Kelberine v. Societe [ntemationale, a case dismissing World War II claims as too large to be 
judicially manageable. Kelberine did not involve the Baker tests, and was a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Alperin, 410 F.3d at 554 (discussing 
Kelberine v. Societe Intemationale, 363 F.2d 989 D.C. Cir. 1966)). 
167 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 555 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
168 [d. at 555. 
169 [d .. 
170 [d. 
171 [d. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
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Holocaust Survivors' claims. The Holocaust Survivors apprised the 
State Department of the case and appeal and the State Department did 
not intervene.172 The State Department's decision not to intervene may 
not be used to determine the position of the State Department or 
Executive Branch.173 However, the lack of a response or statement 
means that the court has no basis for holding that dismissal is required to 
avoid disrespect to either of the political branches. 174 Perhaps, as the 
dissent noted, these claims are simply a way to force the Executive 
Branch to negotiate a settlement. 175 Still, the court allowed for the 
possibility of barring the claims as political questions should the 
Executive Branch intervene later by making a pronouncement which 
would implicate this prong in the Baker analysis. 176 
e. Unusual Need for Unquestioning Adherence to a Policy Decision 
Already Made 
The fifth Baker prong requires dismissal of political questions 
resulting from "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made."m The court's reasoning for this prong 
is simple: because no policy decision was previously made by the 
political branches, there is no need to adhere to such a decision. 178 Thus, 
this prong is inapplicable to the Alperin claims. 
f. Potential Embarrassment from Multifarious Pronouncements 
The sixth Baker prong requires dismissal where the court finds "the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.,,179 This prong of the Baker test is 
not implicated simply when a court carries out its duty to decide cases 
and controversies, even though that might embarrass another branch of 
172 [d. at 555-556. 
173 [d. at 556. 
174 [d. The Supreme Court noted in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain the importance of deferring to 
the Executive Branch in cases where the Executive Branch takes a position on the impact of a case 
on foreign policy. [d. Sosa was a case brought by a Mexican national against the United States and 
the Drug Enforcement Agency for his abduction and rendition to the United States for murder 
charges of which he was acquitted. Judge McKeown's opinion in the Ninth Circuit permitting the 
case to proceed was overruled by the Supreme Court. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 
(2004) (rev'g Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (2003». 
175 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 570 (Trott, J. dissenting). 
176 [d. at 556, 557. 
177 [d. at 557 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
178 [d. 
179 [d. at 558 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
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government. 180 Rather, the sixth prong prohibits the court from passing 
judgment on foreign policy decisions. 181 Again, the court's reasoning is 
based on the lack of pronouncements made by the political branches of 
government. 182 With that, the majority concluded that the property 
claims are not political questions, and are therefore justiciable. 183 
2. The Justiciability of the War Objectives Claims 
Included in the war objectives claims are the Holocaust Survivors' 
allegations that the Vatican Bank and other defendants "aided and 
abetted ... war criminals," "committed war crimes, crimes against peace 
and crimes against humanity ... ," showed "a clear pattern of violat[ing] 
diplomatic norms ... ," and were involved in or profited from slave 
labor. 184 
The majority stated: "[w]e are not a war crimes tribunal.,,185 The 
Executive Branch pursued and prosecuted war crimes after World War II 
and the Judicial Branch should not question the decisions made by the 
Executive during that time. 186 The Nuremburg Tribunals were a project 
of the Executive Branch, not the Judiciary.18? The Judiciary should not 
intrude on any Executive Branch decisions made in the aftermath of 
World War II, particularly where it would require the Judiciary to 
condemn foreign entities for international crimes, including crimes 
against peace and crimes against humanity; those determinations would 
intrude on Executive decisions about World War 11.188 Making these 
determinations would require the Judiciary to improperly intrude on the 
policy choices that are constitutionally committed to the political 
branches, namely, that the United States and its allies did not prosecute 
180 [d. 
181 [d. 
182 [d. The Vatican Bank argues that because the Executive Branch's stated policy is to 
resolve World War II claims with diplomacy and negotiations, a judicial decision in this case would 
interfere with that policy and cause embarrassment for the Executive. [d. Judge McKeown 
responds, however, that courts should not lightly shirk their duty to adjudicate claims, and that 
because "this lawsuit is the only game in town with respect to claimed looting and profiteering by 
the Vatican Bank," the Court should let the property claims proceed. [d. 
183/d. 
184 [d. at 559. 
185 /d. at 560. 
186 [d. at 559-560. 
187 [d. at 559. 
188/d. at 559-560. The property claims would simply require a determination of whether 
stolen assets are currently held by the defendants, the war objectives claims require a determination 
that the behavior of the Vatican Bank and Ustasha constituted, for example, war crimes or genocide. 
[d. at 559. 
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the Vatican Bank or Ustasha. 189 The court's analysis in this regard is 
fundamentally consistent with the very reasons for the political question 
doctrine: respect for the separation of powers inherent in the structure of 
the federal government. 
The court acknowledged difficulty addressing the justiciability of 
the slave labor claims. 190 The court's central reasoning regarding the 
slave labor claims was that, "[d]etermining whether the Vatican Bank 
was unjustly enriched by profits derived from slave labor would . . . 
necessitate that we look behind the Vatican Bank and indict the Ustasha 
regime for its wartime conduct.,,191 The plaintiffs essentially alleged that 
the Ustasha enslaved the plaintiffs, that some of the profit from this slave 
labor flowed to the Vatican Bank, and that this profit should be 
disgorged. 192 The court thus determined that the slave labor claims were 
derivative claims. 193 Because this determination would question the 
actions of the Executive Branch following World War II, the court 
concluded slave labor claims were political questions. 194 
The court also disavowed any suggestion that its decision in Alperin 
might create a split with the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. 
Karadzic. 195 The Kadic decision involved slave labor and forced labor 
claims resulting from the actions of the Bosnian-Serb military forces in 
the former Yugoslavia.196 The Second Circuit held the claims were not 
political questions. 197 According to Judge McKeown, one important 
factor in Kadic that distinguishes the case from Alperin is that the State 
Department expressly disavowed any use of the political question 
doctrine as a defense against the plaintiffs in that case.198 
3. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Judge Trott 
Judge Stephen Trott concurred with the finding that the war 
objectives claims should be dismissed as political questions, but 
dissented from the majority's holding that the property claims should 
189 1d. at 560 (citing Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (1992». 
190 ld. 
191 ld. at 561. 
192 1d. 
193 1d. at 560-561. 
194/d. at 561. 
195 Kadic v. Katadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
196 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-237. 
197 ld. at 236. 
198 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 562 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249). Also, the Kadic claims involved a 
single person, rather than an entire regime during a world war. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-251. 
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proceed. 199 Judge Trott found the division between property claims and 
war objectives claims untenable.2OO In response to the majority's claim 
that, because there is no other process underway to address the Holocaust 
Survivors' claims, "this lawsuit is the only game in town,,201 the dissent 
stated, "[t]his is not our 'game,' period.,,202 According to Judge Trott, 
the silence of the other branches of government should not have any 
bearing on whether the Judiciary has jurisdiction over the Holocaust 
Survivors' claims, and furthermore, the lack of any relevant executive 
agreement is ''meaningless.,,203 
The dissent also found the claims to be simply too overwhelming 
for judicial scrutiny, requiring dismissal for lack of judicially 
manageable standards under the second prong of the Baker analysis.204 
According to the dissent, the decision in Alperin will overwhelm the 
Judiciary with claims resulting from the horrors across the world.205 For 
these reasons, Judge Trott agreed with the district court's finding that all 
of the Holocaust Survivors' claims were political questions. 
III. THE DEMARCATION BETWEEN PROPERTY AND WAR OBJECTIVES 
CLAIMS Is A SOUND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Judge Trott, in his dissent to the Alperin majority, recognized that 
"[i]t is unlikely that a better case could be made for the majority's view 
that some of these matters are justiciable.,,206 Judge McKeown, writing 
for the majority, correctly saw a distinction between the more typical 
claims involving stolen assets and those claims requiring a determination 
of human rights violations?07 Although the United States has an 
obligation to render justice for the Holocaust Survivors, Judge McKeown 
correctly recognized the difficulties involved in such determinations.208 
The Judicial Branch must, like the other branches of the federal 
199 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 563 (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting). 
200 [d. (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting). 
201 [d. at 558. 
202 [d. at 565 (Trott, 1. concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
203 [d. (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting). 
204 [d. at 570 (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting). The majority read Vieth differently than 
Judge Trott, who found the Holocaust Survivor's claims overwhelming. According to the majority, 
the inquiry is whether there are standards based on reasoned distinctions, not whether the claims are 
overwhelming. See Part II discussion above of the majority's analysis of Vieth and Judicially 
discoverable standards. 
205 [d. (Trott, 1. concurring and dissenting). 
206 [d. at 563 (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting). 
207 !d. at 548. 
208 [d. at 562. 
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government, permit each branch its proper role.209 
The court in Alperin found a creative solution to the political 
question issues with its distinction between war objectives claims and 
property claims. The Complaint in this case referred to human rights 
violations and violations of international law, not war objectives 
claims.2 \o Nevertheless, the Majority used the phrase "war objectives 
claims" to address all of these claims.211 Nevertheless, the majority 
correctly understood that certain claims would require an extensive 
analysis of the choices made by the Executive Branch during World War 
II and would therefore be nonjusticiable.212 
Adjudication of the property claims does not require an improper 
inquiry into the decisions made by the Executive Branch during and after 
World War II.213 The same is not true of the war objectives claims.214 
Determining whether genocide, war crimes, crimes against peace, or 
crimes against humanity have occurred requires a qualitatively different 
analysis; whether the Vatican Bank is liable for such crimes would 
require an in depth analysis of the Vaticans' political decisions. 
More problematic, determining war objectives claims would require 
review of the U.S. President's decision not to pursue such claims after 
the termination of World War II. In light of the fledgling Cold War, 
those decisions involved the most delicate and subtle political 
calculations.215 For example, Judge McKeown recognized that claims 
that the Vatican was involved in ferrying Nazi and Croatian war 
criminals to the Western Hemisphere could also easily be alleged against 
the United States after World War II.216 Permitting such claims would 
question or show disrespect for decisions made by the Executive 
Branch.217 The political question doctrine prohibits claims which 
embroil courts in analysis of issues where the dispositive factor would be 
the soundness of the Executives' political decisions during and following 
World War II.218 
209 See e.g. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 46-47. 
210 Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'll'll76-97. The cause of action for human rights 
violations and violations of intemationallaw in the Holocaust Survivor's Complaint states, among 
other things, that "the actions and conduct of Defendants, in addition to being profitable, actively 
assisted the war objectives of the Ustasha Regime." Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at '1193. 
2Il Alperin, 410 F.3d at 558-562. 
212 [d. at 562. 
213 [d. at 555-556. 
214/d. at 559-560. 





Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss1/4
2006] PROPERTY, WAR OBJECTIVES, AND SLAVE LABOR 41 
This is not to say that the Holocaust Survivors do not deserve relief 
for the war objectives claims.2I9 Rather, the Judicial Branch is simply 
not equipped to make that decision without offending the constitutional 
separation of powers.220 Whether the Vatican Bank illegally holds funds 
or profited from criminal acts may have significant evidentiary hurdles. 
However, these issues are distinct from the political question problems 
raised, for example, by the claims that the Vatican assisted in ferrying 
war criminals out of Europe, which could bring into question the 
Executive's political decisions.221 The court's holding is narrow and 
based on sound reasoning. 
IV. THE SLAVE LABOR CLAIMS ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE 
PROPERTY CLAIMS, AND ARE THEREFORE NOT POLITICAL 
QUESTIONS 
The slave labor claims are more like the property claims than the 
war objectives claims. The majority recognized that the slave labor 
claims are difficult to categorize?22 Allegations regarding slave labor are 
specifically stated in the unjust enrichment cause of action, although 
slavery allegations are present throughout the Complaint.223 Classifying 
the slave labor claims as war objectives claims has cursory appeal. 
Slavery is a jus cogens norm under international law, so that no treaty or 
agreement can vitiate a state's obligation to avoid the use of and punish 
the use of slave labor.224 In this way, slavery is very different from 
property theft; property theft is a serious violation of law, but it is not 
nearly as great a threat to humanity as slavery. 
The slavery claims are, however, in many ways dissimilar to the 
other war objectives claims. The claims are at least somewhat analogous 
to false imprisonment, and could be decided under a similar standard.225 
219 [d. at 562. 
220 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (Scalia, 1. writing for the plurality) (" ... law pronounced by the 
courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions."). 
221 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 560. 
222 [d. 
223 Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'lI8\. 
224 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Indeed, 
the supremacy of jus cogens extends over all rules of international law; norms that have attained the 
status of jus cogens 'prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of 
international law in conflict with them. "') (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States § 102 comment k (\987)). 
225 For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (2005) states: "( I) An actor is subject 
to liability to another for false imprisonment if (a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third 
person within boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a 
confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it. (2) 
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In this way, the slave labor claims are more similar to the "garden-
variety" claims of unjust enrichment, conversion, the right to an 
accounting, and restitution. 226 
Slave labor claims are dissimilar to the other war objectives claims 
in other ways. Analyzing crimes against peace or crimes against 
humanity requires a much more extensive analysis of political decisions 
by governments and institutions than analyzing property claims. Slave 
labor claims could be resolved using the same kinds of evidence and 
standards required for resolution of the conversion, unjust enrichment, 
restitution, and accounting. 
Resolution of the slave labor claims is not, unlike the war objectives 
claims, committed to a political branch of the government. The majority 
states that "[d]etermining whether the Vatican Bank was unjustly 
enriched by profits derived from slave labor would ... necessitate that 
we look behind the Vatican Bank and indict the Ustasha regime for its 
wartime conduct. We are not willing to take this leap.'0227 However, the 
same inquiry is required in deciding the property claims. Without 
determining whether and how much property was stolen by the Ustasha, 
the judiciary would be unable to adjudicate the property claims. To 
determine whether property was stolen, the court must look to the 
Ustasha's wartime conduct in relation to the plaintiffs. 
The majority further distinguished the property and slave labor 
claims by suggesting that permitting the slave labor claims would require 
evaluation of "the Ustasha's wartime use of slave labor, quantify the 
monetary value of this labor, and then determine the portion thereof that 
flowed to the Vatican Bank.,,228 With the property claims, the plaintiffs 
would only have to show the amount of seized assets which are in the 
possession of the Vatican Bank.229 This distinction is not meaningful. 
Determining the value of stolen property is not markedly different from 
assigning a monetary value to labor or lost wages.230 Expert witnesses 
and historians can testify to the value of labor and to the value of 
property. Determining the profit from slave labor which flowed from the 
An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (I, a) does not make the actor liable 
to the other for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, although the act involves an 
unreasonable risk of imposing it and therefore would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened 
bodily harm." 
226 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 548. 
227 ld. at 561. 
228 ld. at 561 n.18. 
229 ld. 
230 Courts often examine damage awards for lost wages or earnings; see e.g. Strauss v. 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 67 S.W.3d 428, 435 (Tex. App. 2002) ("Loss or impairment of past, as 
well as future, earning capacity is recoverable as an element of damages in a personal injury case."). 
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Ustasha to the Vatican Bank is not different from determining the 
percentage of assets which flowed to the Vatican Bank from stolen 
property. Finally, the plaintiffs must offer evidence sufficient to 
withstand summary judgment, which is decided at a later stage of the 
proceedings than justiciability. If the plaintiffs fail to offer sufficient 
evidence, the district court can still dismiss the claims. 
The majority also cited the third Baker test, an initial policy 
determination, as the basis for dismissal of the slave labor claims.231 
According to the majority, "[i]t is not our place to speak for the U.S. 
Government by declaring that a foreign government is at fault for using 
forced labor during World War II. Any such policy condemning the 
Ustasha regime must first emanate from the political branches.,,232 Yet, 
as the majority noted in its opinion, the State Department issued a report 
detailing many of the Ustasha's activities in an effort "to confront the 
largely hidden history of Holocaust-related assets after five decades of 
neglect.,,233 This may not be sufficient to qualify as an initial policy 
determination, but it is at least a condemnation of the Ushtasha-related 
theft of assets. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Holocaust Survivors' allegations that the Vatican Bank and 
others profited from crimes committed by the Ustasha during and after 
World War II are, at the least, controversial, and have certainly not yet 
been proven. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Alperin v. 
Vatican Bank, the Holocaust Survivors' claims still might face dismissal 
for reasons other than the political question doctrine.234 The case is 
extremely complicated and potentially massive, considering the large 
class spread across many countries.235 
Nevertheless, the political question doctrine should not be a bar to 
many of the Holocaust Survivors' claims. The Ninth Circuit's 
distinction between property and war objectives claims was a useful 
technique in resolving the political question doctrine issues. However, 
the court should have included the slave labor claims within the umbrella 
of the property claims, not within the war objectives claims. The 
plaintiffs face a difficult task in obtaining relief in this litigation, but the 
231 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 561. 
232 1d. 
233 Id. at 540 (citing Ustasha Treasury Report, iii). 
234 Alperin. 4\0 F.3d at 538, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1141 (2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
1160 (2006). 
235 Alperin, 4 \0 F.3d at 541. 
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plaintiffs should have a chance to proceed with their case in United 
States courts. 
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